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Coffman, J. (2003, June).  Lessons in evaluating communications campaigns:  Five case 
studies.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard Family Research Project.  Builds on the findings of the 
first and second papers.  It examines specifically how campaigns with different purposes 
(individual behavior change and policy change) have been evaluated, and how evaluators have 
tackled some of the associated evaluation challenges that the first three papers raised as 
important to address.  It features fi ve brief case studies in which the main unit of analysis is not 
the campaign, but the campaign’s evaluation.  The case studies provide a brief snapshot of the 
real experiences of campaign evaluations.  The paper also features cross-case lessons that 
highlight important findings and themes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
This is the fourth in a series of short-term research projects and papers that are part of a 
larger movement coordinated by the Communications Consortium Media Center to build 
capacity for improved evaluation in the nonprofit communications arena (see Appendix A 
for a description of all four projects).  Each of these projects, including this one, was 
designed to take us closer to the goal of responding to the acute need in this field for 
better information about how to evaluate communications efforts.  The need for practical 
advice is great, including examples of how others have already responded to the distinct 
evaluation challenges that communications efforts present. 
 
Previous research and the opinions of experts about the needs and opportunities in the 
field of communications evaluation have revealed some key findings (e.g., Bohan-Baker, 
2001b; Coffman, 2002b; Dorfman, Ervice, & Woodruff, 2002; Dungan-Seaver, 1999; 
Henry, 2002; Sutton & Thompson, 2002): 
 
Evaluation practice needs to keep pace with campaign advancements.  As the 
practice of “strategic communications” has grown in recent years and proliferated 
among nonprofits that recognize its potential value, interest in determining whether 
and how these practices add value and how they can be improved for better effect 
also has grown.  But the actual practice of, and knowledge base about, nonprofit 
communications evaluation simply has not increased at a concomitant or satisfactory 
rate – both in terms of the number of people who evaluate their communications 
efforts and the quality of the evaluation work that is being done.  This leaves many 
wondering whether increased investments in communications have been worth it. 
 
We need to know more about evaluating campaigns to change policy.  Most of 
us are familiar with communications campaigns for the purpose of individual behavior 
change (e.g., stop smoking, don’t drink and drive).  These types of campaigns of 
course are still common, but another type of nonprofit campaign has taken popular 
hold in recent years – campaigns for the purpose of achieving policy change.  Yet 
while their popularity is growing, we know little about, and practice less, how to 
evaluate efforts designed to cause policy change.   
 
A certain standard of rigor should be expected.  While different evaluation needs 
and questions require different standards of methodological rigor, communications 
evaluation in general needs to focus on more than just what is easy to count.  We 
have to focus on more than just the outputs or measures of our own communications 
performance (e.g., counting the number of op-eds written or press conferences held), 
and push ourselves to focus more on the outcomes of those efforts for the audiences 
we are trying to reach.   
 
We need to keep evaluation design options open and focus more on learning.  
While we need to raise the bar on our methodological rigor in general, at the same 
time we have to remember that not all evaluation needs to conform to the “gold 
standard” of research and evaluation design – experimental designs that use random 
assignment to control and experimental groups or conditions.  Sometimes the need 
is not to determine whether the communications effort definitively caused later 
effects, but to learn how to do the work better.  This means opening the range of 
evaluation possibilities up to more than just the traditional research paradigm in 
which the evaluation remains separate from the campaign and does not contribute to 
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learning or continuous improvement.  This does not mean evaluators cannot be 
objective or rigorous in their evaluation approach.  It merely means evaluation 
designs need to be more in tune with the evaluation questions being raised, and 
more open (regardless of the design used) to feeding back information that is going 
to be useful and used.   
 
This paper is intended to move us closer to developing the tools we need to address 
these issues and take advantage of the possibilities that lay before us.  It presents five 
case studies of already-completed campaign evaluations.  They represent a diverse 
array of both campaign types and evaluation approaches, and offer specific examples of 
how evaluation can respond to the challenges summarized above.  Each case study 
includes a set of lessons about what can be learned and applied from the evaluation, 
and the paper finishes with a set of cross-case-study lessons gleaned from these 
evaluations and others. 
 
Note that this paper uses the term “communications campaign” broadly.  
Communications efforts are not always called campaigns.  The case studies in this 
paper demonstrate that they can also be labeled programs, projects, or initiatives.  In 
addition, campaigns do not have to be stand-alone entities, nor do they have to be highly 
formal efforts.  As the case studies here show, in fact, very few communications 
campaigns are stand-alone efforts.  They can also be an organized set of 
communication activities that are embedded within, or complementary to, a larger set of 
work designed to achieve a common end (Dorfman et al., 2002).  While this last fact 
presents evaluation challenges, it also presents unique opportunities for learning about 
what it takes to make social change happen.   
 
 
II. TWO MAIN CAMPAIGN TYPES 
 
Although communication campaigns come in many varieties and cannot be placed into 
clean mutually-exclusive categories, the field is increasingly making a distinction 
between at least two main types of campaigns based on their primary purpose, or what 
the campaigns are ultimately trying to achieve:  individual behavior change versus policy 
change campaigns (e.g., Dorfman et al., 2002; Dungan-Seaver, 1999; Henry & Rivera, 
1998).  The case studies in this paper feature both campaign types.1 
 
Individual behavior change campaigns try to decrease in individuals the behaviors that 
lead to social problems or promote behaviors that lead to improved individual or social 
well-being.  Policy change campaigns attempt to mobilize public and decision maker 
support for policy support or change (Coffman, 2002b; Dorfman et al., 2002; Dungan-
Seaver, 1999; Weiss & Tschirhart, 1994).   
 
In some ways, as is illustrated in the case studies, campaigns for both end purposes 
look similar.  For example, the types of activities used are often the same (e.g., 
dissemination of informational materials, public service announcements, etc.).  So are 
some of the variables campaigns try to affect on their way to achieving either purpose.  
For example, Figure 1 shows other variables that fall along the continuum toward each 
end – attitudes, awareness, social norms, and public will.   
 
                                                 
1 Case studies feature three individual behavior change campaigns and two policy change campaigns. 
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Figure 1.  Continuum of Campaign Types According to Purpose  
 
 
While affecting public will, or the extent to which the public cares about and supports a 
specific policy position, is more often associated with policy change campaigns, behavior 
change campaigns may also have an element of public will in their design, as public will 
may be related to social pressures or norms about how an individual should or should 
not behave (e.g., anti-smoking campaigns).2  As Ethel Klein (2002) said: 
 
The trick is figuring out where the locus of responsibility for the behavior change should 
be.  Is it purely on the individual performing the behavior or is it also on creating public 
will and social responsibility to help make that change happen?  You have to look at the 
issue’s epidemiology, and say, “What are the root causes and what sustains the 
behavior?”  
 
Similarly, while behavior change campaigns are almost always associated with attempts 
to affect awareness and attitudes, the same may be true for policy change campaigns.  
Communications efforts geared toward policy change often include an element of public 
will building for that change.  If that will does not already exist, then those efforts may 
make an attempt to build it by influencing awareness or attitudes about that policy issue 
and position. 
 
The difference in a campaign’s primary purpose (individual behavior versus policy 
change) is a critical factor in decisions about how a campaign’s evaluation will be 
designed.  On the one hand, determining a campaign’s purpose is important because it 
affects how a campaign will be judged in the end on the degree to which it has been 
successful.  On the other hand, and more importantly, purpose is important to evaluation 
because it is the primary factor that drives a campaign’s theory of change, or what an 
evaluation is ultimately designed around.  The next section discusses theories of change 
that underlie campaigns for each purpose and illustrates the types of relationships 
between the variables that commonly appear between campaign activities and their end 
results.   
 
 
III. CAMPAIGN THEORIES OF CHANGE 
 
Theories of change force us to think through and put down on paper what we are doing 
(our activities) in connection to what we are trying to achieve (our outcomes), and to lay 
out the pathways and variables through which we expect change (behavior or policy) to 
occur.  They are a representation of what we think needs to be in place to make change 
happen.  Typically a theory of change is based on a combination of objective evidence, 
theory, experience, and subjective opinion and personal ideology (Frumkin, 2002).  The 
theory is not fixed, but may change and improve as the theory is tested and more 
evidence gathered.  A discussion about the theories of change that underlie 
communications campaigns is important to any discussion about evaluation because 
they can be a critical driving force in decision making about an evaluation’s design.   
                                                 
2 The terms policy change campaigns and public will campaigns are often used interchangeably. 
Behavior Change Policy Change
Attitudes Public WillAwareness Social Norms
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Each of the five case studies featured here includes the campaign’s theory of change as 
an introduction to the evaluation approach used.3  While each theory of change is 
unique, campaigns for similar purposes (individual behavior change or policy change) 
tend to share some commonalities.   As such, what follows is an attempt to lay out 
general theories of change for individual behavior and policy change campaigns, which 
then serve as an introduction to the thinking behind the case study theories of change 
that appear later.  They are based on theoretical and empirical research, as well as an 
examination of many campaign models.  They are not the only theories of change that 
campaigns are based on, as the case studies in this paper reveal.  Rather, they 
represent a composite and simplified sketch of the types of variables and relationships 
that commonly link communications activities with their intended results, i.e., individual 
behavior change and policy change. 
 
 
A. Individual Behavior Change Campaigns 
 
Individual behavior change campaigns try to change in individuals the behaviors that 
lead to social problems or promote behaviors that lead to improved individual or social 
well-being.  Well-known campaigns in this category target behaviors such as smoking, 
drug use, designated driving, seat belt usage, domestic violence, or fire and crime 
prevention.  Many come from the public health arena, but this type of campaign has 
branched out into other areas such as education and early childhood (see Dorfman et 
al., 2002, for a description of numerous behavior change campaigns).   
 
Fortunately, decades of behavior change research have taught us much about what it 
takes to affect human behavior.  In the last decade in particular, much progress has 
been made on incorporating social science theory into both campaign design and 
evaluation (see, for example, the Voluntary Ozone Action Program case study in this 
paper).  Behavior change theorists and researchers now agree on a number of factors 
that have been proven to influence behavior (Fishbein, Triandis, Kanfer, Becker, 
Middlestadt, & Eichler, 2001), and campaign designers have benefited from this 
knowledge.  For example, research and experience tells us that information to increase 
a person’s knowledge or awareness about the need to change or adopt a particular 
behavior typically does not change behavior on its own.  How many people are still 
smoking even though they know the substantial cancer risks?  As a result, fewer 
campaigns are only disseminating information to increase people’s awareness.  More 
are designed to influence other aspects of how we think about and act on issues, such 
as whether we have the self-efficacy (perception in our capability to perform the 
behavior) necessary to change the behavior, or what our perceptions are about what our 
friends and family are doing (social norms) or want us to do (subjective norms). 
 
Figure 2 offers a general theory of change for behavior change campaigns.  The first 
column represents broadly the various types of message dissemination a campaign 
might use.  This is not a comprehensive list.  That column also shows boxes with dashed 
lines to represent the fact that such efforts are usually implemented alongside other 
activities also designed to contribute to the ultimate outcome of behavior change.  While 
those activities would presumably have relationships with at least some of the outcomes 
                                                 
3 The author for purposes  of illustration in this paper developed these figures.  Campaign documents, 
materials, conceptual models, and logic models informed them. 
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represented here (and others of their own), this model addresses only the relationships 
between communications-related activities and their outcomes. 
 
Figure 2.  General Theory of Change for Individual Behavior Change Campaigns 
 
The short-term and intermediate outcomes in this model include a list of common 
variables that communications activities typically try to affect, and that we know from 
research can have a relationship with behavior change (see also Coffman, 2002a).  This 
also is not a comprehensive list.  Note that a communications effort typically does not try 
to affect all of the variables represented in the model.  Rather, the specific variables that 
apply to a campaign will vary.  For example with some campaigns, particularly either 
mature campaigns or campaigns in which the issues or behaviors being addressed are 
already well-known, increasing awareness will not be a necessary outcome.  That 
campaign may focus more on trying to get people to care more about performing a 
behavior or on their attitudes toward performing that behavior. 
 
The model also does not represent the specific order and pathways between the 
activities and outcomes.  For example, some campaigns view awareness as a shorter-
term outcome or precursor to attitude change.  Others would insert saliency between 
those two variables, arguing that a person has to care about the behavior or feel it is 
relevant in order for attitudes to change.  The case studies illustrate the different ways of 
representing these middle variables and relationships. 
 
 
B. Policy Change Campaigns 
 
Policy change campaigns attempt to mobilize public and decision maker support for 
policy change.  These types of campaigns are less understood than individual behavior 
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change campaigns, but as they increase rapidly in number, so does our need to 
understand how they work (see also Salmon, Post, & Christensen, 2003 for more about 
these kinds of campaigns).   
 
Figure 3 presents a general theory of change behind policy change campaigns.  Like the 
model offered for behavior change campaigns, this is not the only theory of change on 
which such campaigns are based.  Rather, it represents a composite sketch of common 
types of variables and relationships between those variables that begin with campaign 
(and other) activities and end with policy change (and implementation).  While this model 
focuses on communications activities that are designed to affect policy change, it 
acknowledges the fact that rarely do communications activities alone achieve policy 
change.  Typically they act as a complement to other policy advocacy activities, such as 
coalition or community organizing, or one-on-one policymaker outreach.  These 
additional activities are represented as boxes with dashed lines in the activity column of 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  General Theory of Change for Policy Change Campaigns 
 
The activity of media advocacy assumes a prominent position in this model, as it is 
common to many communications efforts working toward policy change.  Media 
advocacy is the strategic use of news media to advance a social or public policy initiative 
(Holder & Treno, 1997; Wallack & Dorfman, 2001).  Activities central to media advocacy 
include 1) elaborating policy options that are to be supported, 2) identifying the 
policymakers with power over decision making on those options, 3) identifying the 
audiences that can be organized to put pressure on policymakers, and 4) targeting the 
audiences with messages in support of the policy options (Wallack & Dorfman, 2001). 
 
Media advocacy is designed to influence both the quantity and quality of media coverage 
about a particular issue.  It presumes that the way an article or news story is framed – 
the way information is organized, the pictures used, sources referenced, etc. – has an 
effect on the way people perceive the issue being discussed (Gamson, 2000; Ryan, 
1991).   As such, it focuses on issues as social rather than personal problems; the idea 
is to get many people to care about and act on an issue, not just those with the 
problems.   
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Media advocacy often also presumes that people will pay more attention to and care 
about an issue if it is placed in a local context.  Therefore it uses activities that “capture” 
the media’s attention, like local events, rallies, or press conferences that the media can 
attend and cover.  Media advocacy can also include developing relationships with 
reporters or editorial boards that may influence coverage, helping reporters put national 
news or issues in a local context, or writing editorials and submitting op-eds. 
 
The effect of increased and/or better media coverage as a result of media advocacy is 
theorized to be two-fold.  It is expected to: 1) influence community awareness, support, 
and public will, which then in turn can impact policymaker support (whether or not the 
policymaker personally cared about or supported the issue in the first place), and/or 2) 
impact policymaker support directly.   
 
Media advocacy can garner public and policymaker support through various theoretical 
mechanisms that may include agenda setting, framing, or priming.  With agenda setting, 
the media does not tell people what to think, it tells them what they should think about 
and which issues are important.  Thus the more often an issue appears in the news, the 
more important it appears (McCombs & Shaw, 1973).4  With framing, the media 
packages information in ways that affect people’s perceptions of particular issues (Bales, 
2002; Bohan-Baker, 2001a).  Priming holds that the media’s attention to some issues 
and not others alters the standards by which people evaluate issues, people, or objects.  
Priming assumes that people do not have a lot of knowledge about a lot of things, and 
therefore make decisions based on what comes to mind first, which is often what they 
saw or read in the media (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987).5 
 
Again, the ultimate outcome here is policy change, which theoretically should have a 
direct relationship with policymaker support for a campaign’s stance on a particular 
issue.   
 
 
IV. EVALUATION CASE STUDIES 
 
This section presents a set of five evaluation case studies that are designed to serve as 
illustrations for how to evaluate organized communications efforts.  Thus far the 
discussion about communications evaluation has not been tied together or grounded in 
comprehensive examples.  These case studies offer those examples.  They are 
campaigns that have already faced and dealt with difficult evaluation choices and 
challenges.  Each chose a different evaluation approach, and each adds to our learning 
about conducting evaluation in this field.  Along with their diversity in terms of evaluation 
approach, the five campaigns were chosen for their diversity in terms of their purpose 
and target audience.   
 
Each case study also features these five elements: 
 
- Theory of change – a visual representation and description of how each 
campaign was designed to achieve its ultimate purpose and the short and 
intermediate outcomes it intended to achieve along the way 
                                                 
4 Although if the issue appears too often in the media, the public may get bored with it. 
5 See also Salmon, et al., 2003 for other theoretical mechanisms that may come into play. 
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- Focus/Methods – the focus of the evaluation or what outcomes were assessed in 
the theory of change, and the methods used to measure outcomes  
 
- Design/Analysis  – the overall design and analysis used to elicit findings 
 
- Key Findings – a brief synopsis of key findings from the evaluation 
 
- Evaluation Lessons – what can be learned from the evaluation experience and 
applied, along with select advantages and disadvantages of the approach used. 
 
 
A. Safe Gun Storage Campaign 6  
 
Eight children and teens die each day from 
gunfire in America.  Many of these deaths are 
accidental and could have been prevented if 
parents had kept their guns stored in a safe place 
and out of children’s reach (Children’s Defense 
Fund, 2002).  Yet of the 35-40% of U.S. 
households that own at least one gun, up to one-
third of all handguns are stored unlocked and 
loaded in the owner's home or vehicle, and more 
than half are stored unlocked (Advertising 
Council, 2002). 
 
Responding to these alarming statistics, the U.S. Department of Justice, National Crime 
Prevention Council, and the Advertising (Ad) Council developed the Safe Gun Storage 
public education campaign to encourage gun owners to store their guns safely 
(unloaded, with both ammunition and gun locked away).  The campaign ran from 
Summer 2000 through Fall 2002, and was distributed nationwide to a target audience of 
gun-owning parents with children in the home.  It included television, radio, print, 
interactive, and out-of-home (e.g., billboard, transit posters) public service messages. 
 
Ads were based on pre-campaign research about the attitudes and behaviors of gun-
owning parents.  That research found that gun owners felt danger was unpredictable and 
random, and that their homes (unlike schools and neighborhoods), were the last safe 
haven for their children.  They also felt that guns were a way of maintaining that safe 
haven.  Many parents therefore connected guns in the house with safety, rather than as 
a potential harm to their children.  As a result, some had not thought through safe gun 
storage issues.  Compounding this were feelings of defensiveness in general about gun 
ownership given the political and social climate related to gun control issues, and strong 
beliefs in the constitutional right to bear firearms. 
 
Based on this research, the campaign’s strategy was not to question parents’ reasons 
for owning guns, but to get them to understand that gun ownership can pose hazards to 
                                                 
6 This case study was informed by telephone interviews and informal communication with George Perlov, 
Senior Vice President and Director of Planning and Research at the Advertising Council.  It was also 
informed by a document review of campaign and evaluation materials, including Advertising Council (in 
press). 
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their children, and to inform them the importance of how to store guns safely.  Ads used 
actual crayon drawings and voiceovers from children trying to cope with accidental 
shootings in their homes in order to bring to light the child’s perspective and to challenge 
the entrenched framing that guns promoted safety (rather than presented danger) in the 
home. 
 
Theory of Change 
Figure 4 shows the Safe Gun Storage campaign’s basic theory of change.  Campaign 
activities primarily involved the release of public service announcements in various 
media markets.  Also included on the model, as connected to but not formally a part of 
the campaign, are the activities of the campaign sponsors and collaborators (e.g., the 
National Crime Prevention Council), who at the same time that the campaign ran were 
using other activities to work toward the same ultimate outcomes and impact. 
 
Figure 4.  Safe Gun Campaign Theory of Change 
 
The first short-term outcome in the model is exposure to the public service 
announcements, the idea being that the audience had to first be exposed to the ads in 
order for them to have any effects.  Exposure is then linked to two additional outcomes – 
awareness and attitudes.  Because pre-campaign research showed that some parents 
were not connecting gun ownership with potential hazards to their children, the 
campaign tried to raise awareness of those hazards.  In addition, the campaign was 
trying to make parents’ attitudes about safe gun storage more favorable, and less 
defensive. 
 
More favorable attitudes were then expected to link to behavior change, or actual safe 
gun storage.  If more parents started storing their guns safely, the desired impact was 
anticipated to be a decrease in the number of children injured or killed in accidental 
firearm incidents.  The campaign also encouraged individuals to seek more information 
about safe gun storage on a website linked to the campaign.   
 
Focus/Methods 
The Ad Council managed the evaluation, but contracted with outside advertising 
research firms to conduct it.  These firms provided their services at a reduced cost, as is 
typical with Ad Council campaign evaluations.  The firms included Michael Scavone, 
Inc., Ipsos-ASI, and Elrick and Lavidge. 
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The evaluation focused on the parts of the theory of change that are bolded in Figure 4.  
These included 1) the quality of the ads produced, and audience 2) exposure to the ads, 
3) awareness of the potential hazards of unsafe storage, 4) attitudes about safe gun 
storage, and 5) behavior change in terms of safe gun storage. 
 
The quality of campaign materials produced was assessed by a campaign review 
committee of leading advertising experts and by examining audience reactions to them – 
whether the target audience understood the main messages, perceived their clarity, and 
felt they were relevant and persuasive.  Michael Scavone, Inc., an independent research 
firm, conducted this “communications check” using interviews with target audience 
members after they viewed various ads.  Interview formats were similar to small focus 
groups, and included half-hour triads (three respondents), twenty-minute one-on-one 
interviews, and half-hour couples interviews. 
 
Quality of television ads was also assessed with a quantitative “copy test” to gather more 
data on target audience responses.  The purpose was to determine ad recall, relevance, 
and persuasiveness.  The advertising research company Ipsos-ASI conducted the copy 
test using their in-home, in-program methodology, which meant contacting randomly 
selected target audience members by telephone, and telling them they had been chosen 
to view a new television program.  They were then sent a video of a television show, with 
one of the ads embedded.  After participants saw the video, they were contacted again 
and interviewed about their responses to the ad.  Measures included measured attention 
– the percentage of respondents who remembered the ad when read an unbranded 
description of it, and brand linkage – the ratio of related recall (linking the brand with the 
ad) and measured attention.  The copy test also included a “control” condition in which 
responses of the target audience were compared with responses to the general 
population. 
 
Exposure was assessed by calculating the dollar value of donated media time for each 
of the two years that ads were available.  Dollar values were calculated separately for 
donated media time from broadcast media, cable television, radio, newspaper, 
magazine, out-of-home placements, Internet, and other media.7  The Ad Council 
contracted with various media tracking services to assess donated media time and 
assign dollar values.8 
 
The remaining outcomes – awareness, attitudes, and behavior, were assessed using 
three target audience surveys with repeated measures – one implemented before the 
campaign, one during, and one after two years had passed.  Elrick and Lavidge, a 
marketing research firm, conducted the surveys.  The pre-campaign survey took place in 
June 2000 with a random sample of 500 adults over 18 years of age living in households 
with children, and with someone in the household owning a gun.  The second survey, 
implemented one year after the campaign’s launch (June 2001), was conducted with a 
similar random sample.  The third survey was conducted after the second year of the 
campaign (July 2002),9 again with a similar random sample.10  The evaluation also 
tracked hits to the website linked to the campaign as a behavioral indicator. 
 
                                                 
7 Ad Council campaigns are distributed using donated media time, as opposed to paid media time.  Media 
outlets have to choose to air or print the PSA; the campaign has little control itself over that decision. 
8 See Perlov (2002) for a description of tracking services the Ad Council uses. 
9 The campaign is still in the field, however, no new materials are being developed. 
10 Note that the surveys selected different samples of individuals for each implementation. 
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Design/Analysis 
The Safe Gun Storage campaign evaluation examined differences at the three 
measurement time points (random surveys of the target population) in terms of 
awareness, attitude, and behavior.  This design did not allow for any definitive 
conclusions about causal links between the campaign and shifts in awareness, attitudes, 
or behavior measured from the first survey through the third, but it did allow for 
comparisons of where the target audience was on these three variables of interest over 
time.11   
 
Key Findings 
About campaign quality: 
- Both the communications check and copy test methods revealed that the target 
audience found the ads were persuasive and were not turned off by them.  
Measures of ad recall during the copy test were high. 
 
About campaign exposure: 
- Over two years, according to estimates using the method described above, the 
ads received over $65 million worth of donated media across all media formats.   
 
About awareness and attitudes: 
- Awareness about safe gun storage ads was high throughout the campaign.12  
Surveys revealed that over half of the respondents indicated they had seen a 
PSA about safe gun storage; this percentage changed little over the two years.   
- The percentage of gun owners who defined safe storage as “locking” their guns 
in a cabinet or rack increased from 38% in the first survey to 58% in the third.  
- The percentage of gun owners who felt it was important to lock up guns in 
households with children remained unchanged over time. 
 
About behavior: 
- Small differences in reported gun storage behavior were noted across the three 
survey waves.  The percentage of gun owners who reported moving their guns 
over the previous six months increased from 6% in the second survey to 12% at 
the end of the campaign.  The Advertising Council concluded that a large 
percentage of gun owners were already storing their guns safely, but that the 
campaign helped to move that percentage higher.   
- Other behaviors showed no changes over time, such as the percentage of gun 
owners who kept loaded weapons in the home (12%), and those who kept their 
guns unloaded, but keep the ammunition in the same room (two-thirds). 
 
Evaluation Lessons 
When many people think about campaigns designed to achieve social change, they 
think about the Ad Council.  Many non-Ad-Council campaigns, in fact, share a lot of the 
same communication characteristics as Ad Council campaigns – development of ads for 
different types of media outlets, and intended effects on audience awareness, attitudes, 
and behavior.  As such, this case study presents a good overview of the evaluation 
challenges and opportunities that many campaigns face. 
                                                 
11 While some might classify it as non-experimental, Cook, Campbell, & Peracchio (1990) define this design 
as quasi-experimental – an untreated control group design with independent pretest and samples. 
12 Note that other gun safety PSAs were also running at the same time, including ads from Americans for 
Gun Safety and the PAX “Ask” campaign. 
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Front-end research is a good guide for evaluation.  A discussion of “front-end” research, 
or research that takes place to inform the development of the campaign, is not the focus 
of this paper.  However, it is important to note the investment that the Ad Council puts 
into front-end research for all of its campaigns (see Perlov, 2002, for more on the Ad 
Council’s approach).  The lesson here is that this research, and what is learned about 
the variables that seem to be driving the particular behavior in question, should inform 
the evaluation.  If front-end research finds, for example, that awareness of an issue is 
already high, but behaviors are not changing, then awareness may not need to be a 
focus of the campaign or the evaluation. 
 
Choices about evaluation designs require realistic tradeoffs.  This campaign presents a 
classic evaluation design challenge prevalent among many campaigns – that for various 
reasons it is difficult to set up an evaluation that will definitively say whether the 
campaign caused its intended effects.  For this campaign, and with most Ad Council 
campaigns, the primary back-end evaluation approach was to compare results from 
surveys taken at different time points with different groups of randomly selected target 
audience members.  This approach is common in communications evaluation. 
 
The Ad Council acknowledges that it is difficult to gauge the success of a public service 
campaign in general, and that there are limitations to what can be concluded from this 
type of evaluation design.  For the Ad Council, controlled designs are difficult because 
their campaigns rely on donated media time; it is not possible to control when the 
intervention occurs, how often it occurs, or who is exposed to it.  Therefore setting up 
comparison or control groups or conditions is difficult to impossible.  Another factor is 
available resources in terms of dollars and time.   These factors limit methodological 
choices.  The Ad Council’s approach is typically less costly and returns results faster 
than designs that use control or comparison groups.13 
 
Interpretation should be qualified with non-controlled evaluation designs.  The main 
challenge to the Safe Gun Storage campaign’s evaluation approach is that it puts 
constraints on the ability to draw conclusions about campaign effects because it makes it 
difficult to deal with various challenges to the interpretive validity of those conclusions 
(Cook & Campbell, 1979).  However, acknowledging those limitations, if the sample is 
randomly selected each time (and of an adequate sample size), it is possible to compare 
results from one survey to the next.  When drawing comparisons with this design, 
however, this question needs to be considered – Would the samples or results have 
changed over time in ways that might not be attributable to the campaign (Cook, 
Campbell, & Perrachio, 1990)?  In this case, the Ad Council identified and reported 
these factors along with results, including historical events that took place during, but 
were not related to, the campaign (i.e., other campaigns implemented during the same 
time frame; the focus on gun safety during the 2000 Presidential campaign; high-profile 
lawsuits against gun manufacturers about gun safety; and a steady wave of tragic 
shootings involving children). 
                                                 
13 This evaluation, front-end research included, cost approximately $125,000. 
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B. Stop It Now! Vermont 14 
 
As many as half a million children in this country 
are sexually abused each year (Villarosa, 2002).  
STOP IT NOW! is a national nonprofit 
organization founded on two core beliefs.  First, 
that child sexual abuse can be prevented through 
the power of public health, and second, that 
children should not bear the sole burden for 
preventing and stopping child sexual abuse.  
While teaching children how to detect the 
difference between “good touch” and “bad touch” 
is important, making children the accountable 
party in a differential power relationship where children are often dependent on their 
abusers, is a limited and incomplete preventative step. Instead, abusers should be held 
directly accountable for their actions.  Contrasting sharply with the predominant 
worldview about how typical abusers behave, STOP IT NOW! calls on all abusers and 
those at risk to abuse to stop their behavior and seek help.   
 
In addition to holding abusers accountable, those around the abuser are also held 
accountable for their actions (or lack thereof).  Since 90% of the victims of child sexual 
abuse know their abusers, STOP IT NOW! calls on all adults – family, friends, neighbors, 
teachers, professionals, and abusers themselves – to prevent abuse before it happens 
and to report it when it does.  This approach is predicated on the experience of 
campaigns such as those to stop drunk driving.  For example, in their initial phases, 
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) campaigns focused on individual responsibility 
with the message “Don’t drink and drive.”  When that approach did not do enough to 
reduce drunk driving, the campaign moved on to the designated driver concept.  It 
emphasized social responsibility and messages focused on the fact that “friends don’t let 
friends drink and drive” (Klein, 2002).  STOP IT NOW! is sending that same message of 
social responsibility for the prevention of child sexual abuse. 
 
These beliefs are put into practice using four main categories of work.  The organization 
develops awareness in those at risk to abuse and encourages them to seek help; offers 
abusers ways to seek help through a confidential helpline; works with families, peers, 
and friends on how to confront abusers; and works to build a social climate that does not 
tolerate child sexual abuse.  This addresses the fact that while people do know to report 
abuse if they are certain it is occurring, many are unclear what to do if there is some 
suspicion but also some uncertainty.  STOP IT NOW! provides the opportunity for people 
to ask in confidence about their suspicions, without reporting it or getting the police 
involved. 
 
In 1995 STOP IT NOW! in partnership with the Safer Society Foundation in Vermont,  
created the first program design for this approach, called STOP IT NOW! VERMONT.15  
                                                 
14 This case study was informed by a telephone interview and informal communication with Joan 
Tabachnick, STOP IT NOW! VERMONT’s Director of Public Education.  It was also informed by document 
review of campaign and evaluation materials; Tabachnick & Dawson, (2000) was a primary source. 
15 STOP IT NOW! organizations also exist in Haydenville, MA (national office), Philadelphia, Minnesota, and 
in the United Kingdom and Ireland.  Note that an evaluation sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control 
and conducted by ORC Macro (an opinion research company), was also conducted with the Philadelphia 
site. 
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The program began as a public health social marketing campaign (it is now much more), 
using print ads, billboards, posters, public service announcements, a website, 
informational materials about child sexual abuse, and media advocacy to change the 
way Vermonters think about and act on this issue.  The campaign is coupled with the 
first helpline in the country that links callers (adult or adolescent abusers, those at risk to 
abuse, or their friends and family) with specific Vermont resources.  The campaign goals 
are to 1) increase public awareness of child sexual abuse, 2) challenge abusers to stop 
their abuse and seek treatment, 3) change attitudes about what can be done to prevent 
abuse, and 4) encourage behaviors by adults to intervene in abuse situations or act 
before the abuse occurs.   
 
Theory of Change 
Figure 5 presents the Vermont program’s theory of change.  The first column of activities 
shows the confidential helpline and the prominence of message dissemination through 
multiple mechanisms.  This includes the media campaign, but also the dissemination of 
informational pamphlets and booklets, and media advocacy. 
 
Figure 5.  STOP IT NOW! Theory of Change 
 
Also shown in Figure 5 are other activities that STOP IT NOW! VERMONT implements, 
which include building partnerships with other community-based organizations and the 
clinical and legal communities in order to build treatment capacity about how to deal 
effectively with this issue.  It also includes a structural component of policy and legal 
system advocacy.  This case study focuses primarily on message dissemination 
activities. 
 
The first expected short-term outcome in the model is calls to the helpline.  Another is 
change in public knowledge and attitudes about child sexual abuse.  For example, in 
order to get the public to accept and react to their social responsibility on this issue, Stop 
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It Now! Vermont believes it is necessary to educate them about what exactly sexual 
abuse is, how prevalent it is in their communities, the early signs of detection, and what 
to do if they see a situation of concern, or if child sexual abuse is detected.  Abusers 
also are educated that confidential help is available.  Another short-term outcome is a 
change in the way the media talks about sexual abuse and abusers (e.g., not only to 
report on sexual abuse after the fact, but to focus on prevention, and to portray people 
who abuse as people who need treatment and can learn to control their behaviors).  
 
Intermediate outcomes include a climate in which social responsibility for preventive 
child sexual abuse is commonly known and accepted.  Currently, the norm is that if 
someone wants help, there appears to be nowhere safe to turn.  Doctors and therapists 
are mandated to turn child sexual abusers in with no guarantee of help.  Defense 
attorneys will advise individuals to keep quiet for fear of arrest, imprisonment, or 
community notification.  Therefore the general public is not the only audience that needs 
to be educated on prevention and treatment options.  Also included here as targets for 
increased awareness and capacity are key decision makers and policymakers, and the 
treatment and legal communities.16 
 
Ultimate behavioral outcomes include those at risk to abuse and abusers seeking and 
receiving help, and those around abusers confronting them and helping them to stop 
their abuse.  The expected impact from those ultimate outcomes is a lower incidence of 
child sexual abuse. 
 
Focus/Methods 
STOP IT NOW! VERMONT and the independent marketing research firm Market Street 
Research in Northampton, Massachusetts, collaborated to evaluate message 
dissemination efforts.  Market Street Research provided their services in-kind and 
worked closely with Vermont staff on the evaluation’s design and implementation.  STOP 
IT NOW! VERMONT staff also tracked indicators of their own work, and conducted data 
collection within the clinical and legal community. 
 
The evaluation focused on the bolded components of the theory of change in Figure 5.  
It assessed the short-term outcomes of whether calls to the helpline came in, and public 
knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs.  The evaluation also assessed an intermediate 
outcome – key decision maker awareness, opinions of, and support for STOP IT NOW! 
VERMONT and their approach.  Finally, the evaluation tested the key assumption that 
abusers would voluntarily seek treatment and legal advice.  The latter outcome is 
represented with a dashed line in Figure 5 because the evaluation did not track the 
behavior of abusers connected to the work of STOP IT NOW! (calls to the helpline are 
confidential).  Rather, it attempted to determine whether any abusers in Vermont had 
voluntarily sought help for their sexual behavior problems. 
 
Helpline staff collected data about calls to the helpline as calls came in.  The data were 
later compiled to determine caller characteristics, reasons for calling, and how callers 
heard about the helpline.  This information tested the assumption that people would 
actually call for help. 
 
                                                 
16 Note that partnership building in the activity column would also link directly to this outcome. 
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Knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs were tracked with a random digit dial telephone survey 
of 200 Vermonters, conducted at three time points – 1995, 1997, and 1999.  Because 
the campaign started in 1995, the first survey served as a “baseline.”  
 
Market Street Research also conducted interviews to assess key decision maker 
awareness and support for STOP IT NOW! VERMONT, views of their successes, and 
the issues they felt still needed to be addressed.   
 
Finally, STOP IT NOW! VERMONT staff collected information about abusers seeking 
treatment or legal help through a survey of clinicians and individual telephone interviews 
in each Vermont county prosecutor’s office. 
 
Design/Analysis 
Because it looked at outcomes in the theory-of-change separately, rather than as linked, 
the evaluation design did not allow for causal inferences from the campaign to its 
outcomes.  Given the resources available and the campaign’s universal reach, an 
alternative design was not feasible.  However, as was described in the previous Safe 
Gun Storage case study, this design does allow for the tracking and comparing of some 
key measures and indicators over time.   
 
Key Findings 
About calls to the helpline: 
- People will use the helpline, including abusers and those at risk for abusing.  
From 1995 to 1997 STOP IT NOW! VERMONT received 657 calls to the helpline.  
Of those calls, 15% were from abusers and 50% were from people who knew the 
abuser and/or victim. 
- While male callers only average about 10% on most hotlines, 32% of the callers 
to the Vermont helpline were male.   
- The campaign is helping to get the word out about the availability of help.  A little 
over one-half of all callers heard about the helpline from either the media or the 
website.  Another 25% heard about it through referrals from other professionals. 
 
About Vermonters knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs: 
- Vermonters who could explain child sexual abuse almost doubled from 1995 to 
1999 (45% to 85%).  Overall awareness about child sexual abuse in Vermont is 
high and remained high over time. 
- More work needs to be done in order to create the public knowledge needed to 
identify the warning signs for perpetration and to provide specific skills and 
information about what to do, especially in situations where the person is unsure 
if any abuse has occurred.  The percentage of Vermonters who could name at 
least one warning sign in an adult or juvenile was low in general, but increased 
slightly from 1995 to 1999 (27.5% to 38%).  Only a little over half of Vermonters 
knew where to refer someone with a sexual behavior problem compared to 77% 
who know where to refer someone with a drinking problem. 
 
About key decision maker support: 
- Key decision makers and stakeholders were positive about STOP IT NOW! 
VERMONT’s work, credibility, and positioning in the state.  Interviews revealed a 
desire for even more involvement in and commitment to this work in Vermont. 
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About abusers seeking treatment or legal help: 
- Abusers will voluntarily seek treatment and legal help.  The survey with clinicians 
and telephone interviews with county prosecutor’s offices identified 118 people 
who voluntarily sought help for sexual behavior problems (20 adults and 98 
adolescents). 
 
Evaluation Lessons 
This case study featured an evaluation that was small, but resourceful.  While other case 
studies feature much larger monetary investments to determine causal inferences, as 
these lessons demonstrate, this evaluation had different, but arguably no less important, 
payoffs.  
 
The evaluation focused on learning.  While it was operating under a very small budget,17 
staff had a real commitment to learning, and therefore placed an emphasis on collecting 
data that would help them understand how to do their work better.  Given that their 
messages were new to Vermont and that they could not invest in an evaluation model 
that would definitively prove causal effects in terms of behavior change, they invested in 
some key pieces that would help them know if some of their assumptions were correct 
and if they were headed in the right direction, as well as the areas in which they needed 
to place more or less emphasis. 
 
The relationship between campaign staff and evaluators was productive and useful.  The 
relationship between the external evaluator and STOP IT NOW! staff was exemplary.  
For example, the evaluator began working with Vermont staff in the initial stages of the 
campaign, and spent a lot of time working with staff on the right survey questions to ask.  
They later wrote their reports in ways that helped STOP IT NOW! staff learn about what 
areas seemed to be working and what areas needed improvement.  The focus here was 
on making sure the evaluation information gathered was useful.  As a result, STOP IT 
NOW! and Market Street Research have developed a lasting relationship.  Their 
approach is an example of how to respond to the fact that too few campaign staff and 
evaluators form relationships that are mutually beneficial or focus on learning. 
 
This approach shows how campaigns can collect their own evaluation data.  This 
evaluation is also an example of how campaign staff can take responsibility on their own 
for identifying and tracking the information they need.  This idea has not caught on as 
much in the communications arena as it has in the human services fields.  In this case, 
Vermont STOP IT NOW! staff knew that it would be important to track from the very 
beginning information about the calls they received on their helpline.  Today they can 
use this information to demonstrate the fact that their assumption that abusers will call is 
correct, and to determine what treatment and capacity needs are still unmet.  Staff also 
took it upon themselves to conduct interviews with the treatment and legal community.  
While sometimes it is necessary to get an external evaluator to do data collection for 
purposes of objectivity, there are often many opportunities for staff to collect data that 
can both demonstrate effects and lead to continuous improvement. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Less than $15,000, keeping in mind the polling services donated in-kind. 
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C. Voluntary Ozone Action Program 18 
 
After amendments were made to the Clean Air 
Act of 1990, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) disseminated air quality standards 
for six airborne pollutants known to be harmful to 
public health, including ground-level ozone.19  
The EPA also established ways of measuring 
compliance with those standards, and found 31 
areas across the country did not meet them.  One 
of those “non-attainment” areas was the 13-
county metropolitan region around Atlanta, which 
specifically did not meet ground-level ozone 
standards (Henry & Gordon, 2003). 
 
As a result, in 1997, the Environmental Protection Division of Georgia’s Department of 
Natural Resources developed the Voluntary Ozone Action Program (VOAP) to reduce 
ground-level ozone in the Atlanta region.  VOAP had two main components:  a public 
information campaign and a voluntary emission reduction program. 
 
The goals of the public information campaign were to 1) raise awareness about and the 
importance of ground-level ozone, 2) inform the public about the health consequences of 
ground-level ozone, and 3) reduce behaviors that cause harmful emissions (related to 
driving mostly).  The campaign primarily targeted the behavior of reduced driving, which 
was estimated to account for 50% of Atlanta’s ground-level ozone production.   
 
Because ozone is undetectable to human senses, it was necessary to increase 
community member awareness of when it was particularly critical to reduce driving.  As a 
result, the campaign used “ozone alerts” to inform the public that ozone concentrations 
would be high the next day.  Alerts were disseminated through electronic highway traffic 
signs, the local newspaper, and radio and television weather and traffic reports.  The 
campaign also included public service announcements, news stories about ground-level 
ozone and pollution, and editorials about air quality. 
 
In addition to the public information campaign, VOAP attempted to create a social 
context that would help lead to the desired behavioral outcomes – namely by getting 
employers to take ozone-reducing actions when ozone concentrations were highest 
(May to October and during the day-time hours).  This included encouraging alternate 
transportation use and telecommuting among their employees, and staggering work 
schedules to reduce rush hour driving.  For example, the Governor issued an executive 
order in 1997 for all state agencies, departments, and institutions of higher education to 
reduce the rate of single occupancy vehicles by 20 percent.  Formal plans for doing so 
were required and progress monitored.  Federal agencies in Atlanta (the region’s largest 
employer) also agreed to implement similar strategies.  Finally, the EPD sought to 
                                                 
18 This case study was informed by document and literature review, including Henry (2002); Henry & Gordon 
(2001); Henry & Gordon, (2003); Henry & Rivera (1998).  It was also informed by a 2002 interview with Gary 
Henry, one of the evaluation’s principal investigators and a Professor in the Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies and the Department of Political Science at Georgia State University. 
19 Ground-level ozone is an odorless and colorless gas undetectable to human senses.  It decreases lung 
capacity in healthy adults, but more seriously affects children, seniors, and those with respiratory problems.  
Negative health effects can subside when ozone levels subside. 
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develop partnerships with private businesses to get their voluntary participation in the 
effort. 
 
It is important to note that considerable front-end research, performed by the evaluators, 
went into the development of the VOAP public information campaign.  While a 
discussion of front-end research is outside the scope of this paper, a few general points 
are important to mention here, as this research was both unique and informed the 
eventual campaign and evaluation design (see Henry & Rivera, 1998, for a more 
detailed explanation).  First, the evaluator began with two related social science theories 
– the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and Theory of Planned 
Behavior (Ajzen, 1985) – about how to effect individual behavior change and the 
variables that predict it.  Using a survey conducted with a random sample of residents in 
the Atlanta region, the evaluator tested the theories’ application to ozone-reducing 
behavior.  Results helped to determine what behaviors the campaign should focus on 
(driving), and the factors that were most likely to affect those behaviors.  For example, 
research revealed that many Atlanta residents were willing to drive less, but they felt as 
if they had little control over their behavior (e.g., because they had to be at work at a 
specific time).  This finding helped to develop VOAP’s push to try to create a social 
context among employers that supported the campaign’s outcomes (for more 
information on this research see Henry & Rivera, 1998).  
 
Theory of Change 
Figure 6 illustrates the general VOAP theory of change.  Activities included both 
components of the program – the public information campaign (ozone alerts, news 
stories) and the development of public and private employer partnerships.   
 
Figure 6.  Voluntary Ozone Action Program Theory of Change 
 
The role of public/private partnerships in this model represents the belief that public and 
private employers who developed partnerships with the Environmental Protection 
Division and got behind the cause of reducing ground-level ozone, would ultimately 
make it easier for their employees to change their driving behaviors (e.g., by organizing 
carpools, allowing flexible work schedules, etc.). 
 
VOAP’s short-term outcomes included an increase in awareness of ground-level ozone 
issues, increased salience of the issue, and a change in social norms concerning what 
should be done about the region’s ozone problem.  Salience and social norms were then 
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expected to lead to behavior change in the form of reduced driving, both in terms of the 
number of miles driven and trips taken.20  If less driving occurred, then presumably this 
would contribute to the reduction of ground-level ozone in metropolitan Atlanta. 
 
Focus/Methods 
Evaluators at the Applied Research Center in the Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies at Georgia State University evaluated the campaign.  The evaluation focused on 
the components that are bolded in Figure 6.   
 
Rolling sample surveys (daily tracking surveys) were the primary assessment method.  
These surveys, which were innovative in this context, obtained measures from an 
independent sample of 32 Atlanta residents each day.21  Interviews took place between 
May 1, 1998 and September 31, 1998 – yielding a total of 2,935 responses over 153 
days.22  Once respondents completed the survey, they could not be interviewed again.  
The independent samples were representative of the population in the 13-county Atlanta 
region (for more information on the use of rolling sample surveys, see Henry & Gordon, 
2001). 
 
The surveys, which were identical on alert and non-alert days, lasted an average of 7.1 
minutes, and included 30 behavioral, awareness, and attitudinal items and 12 
demographic items (Henry & Gordon, 2001).  These included: 
 
- Ratings of the importance of five issues from a personal and community standpoint 
(schools, jobs/economy, air quality, ground-level ozone, environment) 
- Driving behavior over the last 24 hours (number of trips taken and miles driven) 
- Mode of transportation to work in previous 24 hours (drive alone, mass transit, carpool, 
walk or bike, work at home, carpool) 
- Awareness of ozone alerts 
- Perceived efficacy (perceived ability to have an effect on ground-level ozone) 
- Perceived personal health risks (poor air quality affects the person or the person’s family 
directly). 
 
Design/Analysis 
The evaluation tested three core hypotheses: 
 
1) The campaign affected the public’s awareness of ground-level ozone. 
2) Ozone alert days resulted in the reduction of miles driven and trips taken. 
3) Ozone alert days resulted in reduced driving by government employees. 
 
Analyses of the first hypothesis (using an ordinary least squares regression model) 
determined the variables that predicted awareness of ground-level ozone.  The nine 
groups of variables tested as predictors included 1) awareness of ozone alert in past 24 
hours, 2) demographics,23 3) day-of-week, 4) month, 5) commuting distance,24 6) 
                                                 
20 Note that evaluators also explored a number of intermediate outcomes not illustrated in this model, such 
as avoiding driving during rush hours and limiting use of gasoline-powered lawn equipment.  
21 Interviews were done during the late afternoon and evening hours, and were conducted every day except 
Memorial Day and the Fourth of July. 
22 The response rate was 54%.  Completed responses required an average of 6.7 call attempts.  Attempts 
were made up to a maximum of 22 times. 
23 Sex, education, age, income, an income dummy variable for high-income, and minority status. 
24 Included two parts – one for residency and one for work location. 
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location of newspaper story,25 7) perceived community salience of ground-level ozone, 
8) timing of alert,26 and 9) attitudinal factors (perceived efficacy and health risks). 
 
Analyses of the second hypothesis (using an analysis of covariance model) examined 
the variables that predicted driving behavior.  The seven groups of variables tested 
included 1) awareness of ground-level ozone (resulting from the first analyses), 2) 
demographics, 3) day-of-week, 4) month, 5) commuting distance, 6) location of 
newspaper story, and 7) weather.27   
 
These analyses also examined if total miles or trips taken were reduced on alert days 
compared to non-alert days.  Because ozone alerts happened on some days and not 
others, it was possible to develop a natural experiment with ozone alert days serving as 
the days when the treatment occurred, and non-alert days serving as the control days.  
Analyses compared behavior on alert days with behavior on non-alert days.  This design 
allowed for a causal interpretation of whether the campaign caused changes in driving 
behavior. 
 
The third hypothesis related to the question of whether voluntary involvement of 
business, government, or other employers made a difference in the campaign’s 
behavioral results.  As described earlier, most local, state, and federal government 
employers supported VOAP and took steps to encourage a social context in which it 
could be successful.  Private employers were less proactive during the campaign’s first 
year.  As a result, the evaluation could compare government employees to non-
government employees in terms of the extent to which their workplace made a difference 
in reducing miles driven and trips taken on alert days.  If it found that only government 
employees reduced their driving, the evaluation could conclude that the campaign alone 
was insufficient to change driving behavior.  It could not, however, conclude that the 
campaign was a necessary part of the causal package (because it was not possible to 
disentangle how the campaign, apart from employer behavior, would have fared).  
Analyses of this hypothesis looked at whether miles or trips taken were reduced for 
either government or non-government employees on alert days, and if miles or trips 
taken were reduced more for government employees than non-government employees 
on either alert or non-alert days. 
 
Key Findings 
About the campaign’s effects on public awareness (1st hypothesis): 
- Ozone alerts increased the amount of awareness about ground-level ozone.  
Those who were more aware of ozone said the issue was more important to 
them.  Those personally affected by poor air quality were not more aware of 
ground-level ozone.   
- Greater exposure to media messages affected awareness, as commuting 
patterns affected awareness (those who commuted during times when alerts 
were broadcast were more aware, as were those with longer commuting times). 
- Articles on the front-page of newspapers increased awareness, but not articles 
on the Metro page. 
- Those with higher incomes, older residents, and whites heard more about 
ground-level-ozone. 
                                                 
25 Front page or metro section of the Atlanta Journal Constitution. 
26  If the alert was on the previous day or two days prior. 
27 Less driving was expected as the temperature or dew point rose, or if there was rain. 
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About whether ozone alert days resulted in driving behavior change (2nd hypothesis): 
- Overall miles driven were significantly reduced on alert days (35.4 miles on non-
alert days to 29.9 on alert days). 
- Many predictors of driving behavior were as expected – men and individuals with 
higher incomes drove more, and those with the longest commutes drove more. 
- Awareness did not have a significant effect on miles driven, though this did not 
mean that the campaign was not necessary for obtaining reductions in driving. 
 
About whether ozone alert days resulted in reduced driving by government employees 
(3rd hypothesis): 
- On alert days government employees reduced the number of miles driven and 
the number of trips taken by an average of almost one full trip, a statistically 
significant amount, while non-government employees did not. 
- Changes in driving behavior were only significant when social contexts reinforced 
those changes (i.e., employers instituted policies to support the behavior 
change).  Therefore it was concluded that campaigns can increase awareness, 
but changing well-established behaviors probably requires changes in the social 
context supporting that behavior change. 
 
Evaluation Lessons 
This was a resource-intensive and sophisticated evaluation.  Its design and 
implementation required considerable evaluation and methodological expertise.  The 
payoffs, however, were substantial in terms of obtaining definitive findings about the 
campaign’s effectiveness and what it took to change driving behavior.  This evaluation 
contributes much to the knowledge base about how to conduct evaluation in this field. 
 
Rolling sample surveys are a useful evaluation method for this context.  One of the most 
important lessons from this evaluation was methodological, through its use of rolling 
sample surveys.  Adapted from political polling methods, this method, applied in this 
context, was extremely innovative and holds promise for other campaign evaluations, 
particularly when it is possible to “control” the intervention (e.g., knowing which days 
were ozone alert days).  Other common survey methods create measurement and 
interpretation problems.  For example, random sample surveys have biases and 
accuracy problems when it comes to remembering or predicting behavior, and repeated 
surveys with the same people over time have problems with recruitment biases and 
reactivity to repeated measurement.  Where their use is possible, rolling sample surveys 
hold much promise for the field of campaign evaluation.  They can aid in determining 
when the public gets worn out with a particular message, or how unexpected events 
during a campaign impact effects.  They also allow for the testing of various 
communications-related theories (e.g., agenda setting) because of their continuous 
measurement of public opinion over time (Henry & Gordon, 2001). 
 
Social science theory and front-end research informed campaign and evaluation 
planning.  While again a discussion of front-end research is outside the scope of this 
paper, its use here was important to the evaluation.  Here the evaluators used social 
science theory about known predictors of behavior change (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980) to help determine how the campaign could be structured for maximum 
benefit.  A pre-campaign survey of 1,275 Atlanta residents revealed a list of specific 
ground-level ozone reducing behaviors that Atlanta residents were more or less likely to 
do.  Behaviors that were more likely included disposing of leaves without burning, cutting 
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back on miles driven, decreasing rush-hour driving, cutting back on car trips taken, and 
driving less often.  Behaviors not likely to be changed included taking mass transit, 
waiting until the weekend to get gas, or telecommuting.  The campaign then viewed the 
challenge in one of two ways – reinforcing behaviors that were likely or changing 
behaviors that were unlikely.  It chose the former because the challenge with the latter 
was much greater.  In turn, the evaluation then focused on driving behaviors (Henry & 
Rivera, 1998).   
 
This early research also revealed other factors critical to the evaluation.  First, in any 
campaign where behavior change is a goal, it is important that the evaluation measure 
specific behaviors.  It would not have been useful here to ask Atlanta residents if they 
had “performed ground-level ozone reducing behaviors.”  Specific behaviors had to be 
identified in both the campaign and the evaluation (i.e., driving less).  In addition, front-
end research revealed the potential importance of looking at a person’s perceived 
control over particular behaviors, as a moderator of whether those behaviors were 
adopted.  While Atlanta residents expressed that they were not likely to telecommute, for 
example, it was unclear whether this was because they did not have the opportunity to 
do so, or whether they were choosing not to.  This reinforced the point in the campaign, 
and the subsequent evaluation, that it was important to include and examine the effects 
of employer policies on behavior change (Henry & Rivera, 1998). 
 
This evaluation answered questions about whether a campaign alone is sufficient to 
affect behavior.  Finally it is important to recognize this evaluation for the substantive 
value of its findings.  It determined that the information campaign alone was insufficient 
to change driving behavior.  The larger lesson here is that while campaigns can increase 
awareness, changing well-established behaviors probably requires changes in the social 
context to support that behavior change. 
 
 
D. Community Trials Project 28 
 
Research shows that availability of alcohol and 
high-risk alcohol consumption patterns (e.g., 
binge drinking, drinking before driving, and 
underage drinking) can increase a community’s 
risk of alcohol-involved traffic accidents and 
violent assaults.  The Community Trials Project 
tested the potential of a five-year (1992-1996) 
comprehensive community prevention strategy in 
three communities (of approximately 100,000 
residents and located in Northern California, 
Southern California, and South Carolina) to 
reduce the incidence of such alcohol-related risk factors and outcomes.   
 
The project was based on a scientific-community partnership, in which the research 
team identified the core elements of the overall prevention strategy (see below) and 
                                                 
28 This case study was informed by a structured telephone interview with Andrew Treno, Research Scientist, 
at the Prevention Research Center.  It was also informed by document and literature review, including 
Holder, Gruenewald, Ponicki, Treno, Grube, Saltz, Voas, Reynolds, Davis, Sanchez, Guamont, & Roeper 
(2000); Holder & Treno (1997); Treno, Breed, Holder, Roeper, Thomas, & Gruenewald (1996); Treno & 
Holder (1997a); and Treno & Holder (1997b). 
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provided training, technical assistance, and resources around those elements.  The 
project teams in the experimental communities then tailored the strategy and prevention 
elements to their own needs and circumstances (Treno & Holder, 1997a). 
 
The research-based prevention strategy had five interrelated elements.  At the time the 
project started, the efficacy of each element alone had already been proven; however 
they had never been used together to reduce alcohol-related injuries and death (Holder, 
1993; Holder et al., 2000; Treno, Breed, Holder, Roeper, Thomas, & Gruenewald, 1996): 
 
1) Community knowledge, values, and mobilization – This component integrated two main 
aspects – community organizing and media advocacy, and was used to support the other 
four prevention elements that follow.  It included the development of community coalitions 
and task forces to implement specific interventions and to increase community concern 
about alcohol-involved trauma (alcohol-involved traffic crashes that led to injuries and 
fatalities).  Coalitions also implemented media advocacy activities to build community 
support for the four policy-level prevention elements that follow. 
 
2) Responsible beverage service – This component was designed to reduce the probability 
that patrons leaving licensed alcohol serving outlets would be intoxicated or underage.  It 
included incentives for bars and restaurants to provide server and staff training to identify 
intoxicated and/or underage customers in bars and restaurants, and to strengthen 
beverage service policies to prevent customer intoxication and driving under the 
influence.  
 
3) Underage drinking – This component was designed to reduce the social and retail 
availability of alcohol to underage persons.  Included were school-based and community 
programs for parents and kids about sales and access to alcohol by minors, and the 
training of off-premise retailers to reduce sales to minors.  It also promoted the 
enforcement of underage sales laws. 
 
4) Drinking and Driving – Intended to increase the actual and perceived risk of being 
apprehended while driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol, this component included 
media advocacy to increase community support for and awareness of DUI detection.  It 
also included greater law enforcement efficiency and effectiveness in detection, which 
incorporated increased DUI checkpoints, training for police officers in new techniques for 
identifying drunk drivers, and the use of passive alcohol sensors to increase the 
probability of positive detection. 
 
5) Access to Alcohol  -This component included the use of local zoning policy to control 
alcohol outlet density in order to reduce the retail availability of alcohol in communities. 
 
The focus of this case study is on the first element of the five-part prevention strategy, 
community mobilization, which was considered a critical support for the implementation 
of the other four elements.  Community mobilization is defined here as “the purposeful 
organization of community members to implement and support policies that will reduce 
alcohol-involved strategies” (Treno & Holder, 1997a, p. S175).  Two main components 
constituted mobilization in the Community Trials Project – community organizing and 
media advocacy.  Ultimately, mobilization’s objective was the implementation of specific 
community-level policies, connected to the prevention elements above, which had the 
potential of reducing alcohol-involved injuries and death (Treno & Holder, 1997a).   
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Theory of Change 
Figure 7 shows the theory-of-change behind community mobilization in the Community 
Trials Project (developed from conceptual models in Treno et al., 1996; Treno & Holder, 
1997a; and Treno & Holder, 1997b). 
 
Figure 7.  Community Trials Project Community Mobilization Theory of Change 
 
The overall theory of change represents the Project’s assertion that community 
mobilization alone (with the components of community organizing and media advocacy), 
cannot impact alcohol-involved problems directly, but that they should be used in concert 
with and support the other environmental prevention elements (the remaining four 
elements of the strategy defined above).  In this way mobilization is seen as a means of 
supporting local prevention elements that lead to policy change and implementation, 
which in turn can decrease alcohol-involved injury and death (Holder & Treno, 1997).   
 
The first short-term outcome of community organizing was the development of local 
coalitions in the three communities to work on alcohol-involved issues.  Those coalitions 
then formed task forces around the four remaining elements of the prevention strategy 
(i.e., responsible beverage service, underage drinking, etc.).  The coalition was expected 
to increase community awareness and support in the community for these strategy 
elements, while the task forces simultaneously increased key leader support.29  
Community awareness and support were also expected also to have an influence on key 
leader support. 
 
Media advocacy, implemented by both coalitions and community members, was 
designed to use the local media to reshape news content in support of prevention 
strategy elements.  The idea was that local news media would raise awareness of a 
specific alcohol problem, spotlight solutions to alcohol problems, and put pressure on 
key leaders to adopt those solutions (Holder & Treno, 1997).  
 
The link between media advocacy and policy change is based on the idea that media 
coverage will stimulate and support the adoption of relevant alcohol policy by 1) directly 
increasing key leader support for the specific environmental interventions being 
                                                 
29 Key leaders are defined as decision makers who can actually bring about policy changes, including city or 
county council members, public agency representatives (e.g. heads of police departments or school 
superintendents), and private business managers (e.g. owners and operators of licensed alcohol 
establishment) (Holder & Treno, 1997). 
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promoted, and 2) increasing community awareness and mobilizing public action and 
support, which is in turn expected to have an effect on key leaders and consequently 
policy change and implementation.  “Even if local decision makers do not support and 
are even uninterested in an issue, effective media advocacy can change local priorities if 
the decision maker recognizes the level of community importance assigned to a specific 
alcohol problem and the associated preventative policy” (Holder & Treno, 1997, p. 
S190). 
 
Focus/Methods 
The Prevention Research Center (PRC) of the Pacific Institute for Research and 
Evaluation in Berkeley, California evaluated the Community Trials Project.  PRC is a 
national center for prevention research, with a focus on understanding the social and 
physical environments that influence the individual behavior that leads to alcohol and 
drug misuse. 
 
A main objective in this project was research and learning about the effectiveness of the 
prevention approaches used, therefore this project was also known as a prevention trial.  
As such, it used three “experimental” communities where the intervention took place, 
matched with three “comparison” communities where the intervention did not, allowing 
for an examination of differences of effects between the experimental and comparison 
communities.   
 
This evaluation is one of very few that has attempted to systematically assess the links 
between the types of components depicted in Figure 7  It attempted to determine 
whether the intervention as planned was actually implemented, and whether the theory 
of change worked as intended. 
 
Structured weekly project reports and event and intervention forms completed by local 
project coordinators were the primary data sources for the community mobilization 
elements in Figure 7.  These reports and forms captured: 
 
Community organizing activities  – e.g., recruitment and hiring, staff training and technical 
assistance 
 
Media advocacy activities – e.g., press conferences, events to which media are invited, 
editorial writing 
 
Coalition and task force development – e.g., establishment of members and coalition 
bylaws, completion of media advocacy training 
 
Key leader support for prevention strategies and policy change – e.g., police participation 
in media events, city council endorsement for various projects, police chief support for 
increased DUI enforcement 
 
Local planning for the implementation of prevention strategies – e.g., special DUI grant 
developed, planning developed for change in city zoning of alcohol outlets 
 
Community policy change and implementation – e.g., city council adoption of mandatory 
server training (policy), city establishment of zoning for alcohol outlets (policy), police use 
of special DUI enforcement equipment (implementation). 
 
Evaluators verified the information in these reports in various ways.  For example, in the 
case of media advocacy activities, technical consultants validated this information.  
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These data were then entered into an electronic database and used to compile 
chronologies or timelines of critical activities in each community to determine the 
sequencing, timing, type, and extent of critical events.  Local project coordinators were 
interviewed to verify this information (Treno & Holder, 1997a). 
 
Ongoing content analysis of local newspaper coverage of alcohol-involved issues in both 
the experimental and comparison communities, and local television coverage in the 
experimental communities, assessed media coverage and content.  Newspaper articles 
from daily and weekly newspapers in the six communities,30 and published over four 
years of the project’s implementation, were coded using a structured protocol.  Articles 
were coded for date, placement, size, type (e.g., editorial, feature), geographic area 
discussed, and subject matter conforming to the elements in the prevention strategy 
(e.g., responsible beverage service, alcohol outlets, etc.).  Coding also included control 
topics (e.g., drug abuse and enforcement).     
 
To aid in analysis and come up with a more meaningful measure of media coverage, the 
evaluators developed a composite news score that compiled (Holder & Treno, 1997a; 
Treno et al., 1996): 
 
- Total number of stories 
- Total area or time allotted to each story 
- Total number of news stories above average length (18 column inches) 
- Total stories with pictures and graphics 
- Total stories on the front page or in the local TV news program 
 
Composite scores were calculated by month and by community and location covered, 
resulting in a total of 270 separate data points (6 communities across 45 months).   
 
Community awareness and support – These outcomes were assessed using monthly 
community telephone surveys (for 66 months) of 120 randomly selected individuals in 
each of the experimental and comparison communities.  The survey included many 
items that measured variables such as media exposure, awareness of alcohol-involved 
problems, support for specific prevention strategies, and perceived risk of arrest (Treno 
& Holder, 1997b). 
 
Reduction in alcohol-involved injuries and death was tracked with six self-report items 
about alcohol consumption and driving on the community survey, monthly longitudinal 
traffic record data on car crashes, and rates of alcohol-related crashes and assault 
injuries observed in emergency departments and admitted to hospitals. 
 
Design/Analysis 
The evaluation used a longitudinal multiple time series design, and compared data from 
experimental and matched comparison communities. 
 
The evaluation of media advocacy involved determining whether 1) media activities and 
events resulted in increased media coverage in experimental communities compared to 
comparison communities, and 2) whether media coverage led to its intended effects.  
The examination of those questions involved multiple types of analysis.  For the first 
question, for example, evaluators developed a time series plot of the composite news 
                                                 
30 Articles were selected from the first two sections of each daily newspaper, and the editorials and letters to 
the editor.  Articles were selected from the entire weekly newspapers. 
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scores described above for experimental and comparison communities (aggregated for 
each).  They then mapped onto that plot the different stages of project activity drawn 
from the community chronologies (pre-implementation, media campaign, ongoing media 
advocacy, etc.).  Numerous statistical analyses were computed to determine whether 
significant differences existed in news coverage over time resulting from media 
advocacy activities in the experimental communities, compared to the comparison 
communities. 
 
The media advocacy evaluation also examined the connection between media coverage 
and community awareness about various problems and proposed policies.  Analyses 
plotted together and examined over time the two measures to determine their 
relationship in both the experimental and comparison communities.   
 
The longitudinal chronologies (which were 20 pages and more) were analyzed 
qualitatively to determine the chronological concurrence of the community mobilization 
process to its community-level outcomes, including policy changes and implementation.  
In other words, evaluators looked to see if there was a logical sequence within each 
community from community activities and process, to key leader support for the 
prevention strategies and policies being promoted, to the adoption of those policies and 
their implementation. 
 
Key Findings 
About media advocacy’s effects in producing media coverage: 
- Media advocacy was successful in increasing both print and television news 
coverage of local alcohol-related topics in the experimental communities.  A 
statistically significant difference existed between news coverage resulting from 
media advocacy in experimental communities compared to comparison 
communities (Holder & Treno, 1997). 
 
About the link between media coverage and key leader attention: 
- Increased media coverage can focus key leader attention on problems and 
prevention policies or solutions (Holder & Treno, 1997). 
- Successful media advocacy to achieve policy change requires specific policy 
objectives and the awareness and support of those policy objectives by key 
leaders and decision makers.  News attention is insufficient without specific 
policy goals and community organization to support those goals (Holder & Treno, 
1997). 
 
About the effects of the prevention strategy elements and policy change and 
implementation: 
- Community mobilization achieved its ultimate outcome (local implementation of 
policy changes) in all three experimental communities (Treno & Holder, 1997a).   
- Evidence of policy change and implementation related to the components of the 
five prevention elements included (Holder et al., 2000): 
o Responsible beverage service – policies at bars and restaurants changed; 409 
managers and servers were trained. 
o Underage drinking – underage alcohol purchases reduced from 44% to 17%. 
o Drinking and driving – 410 sobriety checkpoints were established. 
o Access to alcohol – stricter zoning requirements were implemented in two of the 
three communities. 
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About the intervention overall: 
- The comprehensive community-based intervention reduced high-risk alcohol 
consumption and alcohol-involved injuries resulting from traffic crashes and 
assaults.   
- Comparing experimental and comparison communities (Holder et al., 2000): 
o Self-reported rates decreased: amount of alcohol consumed per drinking 
occasion declined 6%; having too much to drink declined 49%; driving over the 
legal limit decreased 51%. 
o Traffic data showed that nighttime injury crashes declined by 10% and crashes in 
which the driver had been drinking declined by 6%. 
o Assault injuries in emergency departments declined by 43%; all hospitalized 
assault injuries declined by 2%. 
 
Evaluation Lessons 
This was a resource- and time-intensive evaluation.  Its yield, however, in terms of 
substantive findings and methodological value, is great. 
 
This approach is instructive about the methodology of evaluating community organizing, 
media advocacy, and community mobilization.  While numerous case studies of media 
advocacy have been done and are useful for learning (e.g., Gerber & Dorfman, 1996), 
neither media advocacy nor community organizing, or their effects on policy change, is 
typically systematically evaluated.  This evaluation was methodologically important for 
the field of communications evaluation.  For example, evaluators:  
 
- Used a composite media measure for media analysis – Much analysis of media 
coverage merely provides basic information on article counts.  The composite 
measure approach used here took into account other important factors in the 
measurement of media advocacy efforts and effects, such as article size, 
placement, and the presence of graphics.   
 
- Used event and intervention forms to develop chronologies – This unique 
approach provided a method for systematically assessing the chronological 
concurrence of mobilization activities, with key community leader support, and 
policy change and implementation.  Because this approach was implemented 
after the evaluation had started, the chronologies were time- and labor-intensive 
to develop.  With reporting formats that coincide with evaluation data needs, 
however, this approach is more efficient and holds promise for the many other 
evaluations that face this type of documentation challenge. 
 
This evaluation contributed important substantive findings about community organizing 
and media advocacy.  We know relatively little about the causal effects of community 
organizing and media advocacy on policy change.  This evaluation tested this causal 
chain.  While the evaluation could not separate out effects to determine if either media 
advocacy or community organizing alone could produce policy change, it found that 
media advocacy in combination with community organizing, had an effect.   
 
While not discussed earlier in the case study, another important finding was about the 
relative utility of public information campaigns compared to media advocacy.  The 
evaluation provided the opportunity to compare and contrast public information 
campaigns and media advocacy in one experimental and matched comparison 
community.  It found that media advocacy increased community awareness independent 
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of planned information campaigns – a finding that if replicated in other situations could 
have major cost and resource implications (Holder & Treno, 1997). 
 
 
E. The Devolution Initiative 31 
 
During the mid-1990s, several major policies 
passed down or devolved decision-making 
authority and responsibility for key policy issues 
affecting low-income children and families from 
the federal level to the state and local levels.  
Paramount among these was passage of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, which 
gave states the authority to make their own 
decisions about welfare reform policies. 
 
In response to this trend on both welfare reform and health care issues (e.g., the State 
Child Health Insurance Program), the W.K. Kellogg Foundation formed the Devolution 
Initiative, which from 1996 through 2001, supported 30 national and state research, 
policy, and advocacy organizations, and teams of minority researchers and community 
organizers, to work together – with a particular focus in five states (Florida, Mississippi, 
New York, Washington, and Wisconsin) – on three primary goals:  
 
- To create an objective information base about the impact of welfare reform and 
health care devolution that is useful and useable to a broad group of 
stakeholders, including community members 
- To share the findings with policymakers and the public 
- To use the information and other community resources to promote public 
participation in informing policy agendas and decisions.  
 
Initiative participants used a number of mutually-supporting activities to achieve these 
goals.  All participants (which included both national and state organizations) engaged in 
information development (e.g., research, evaluation, and policy analysis) and 
dissemination.  The Initiative also featured an investment in statewide advocacy 
organizations in the five states to build coalitions, engage in community mobilization, and 
build the capacity of those affected by devolving welfare reform and health care policies 
to participate in and inform the policy process.  The Initiative ultimately strove to inform 
the adoption and implementation of devolution-related policies in states. 
 
Theory of Change 
Figure 8 presents the theory of change behind the Devolution Initiative.   
 
                                                 
31 This case study was largely informed by direct experience, as  the author participated in the evaluation of 
the Devolution Initiative.  Other sources included Harvard Family Research Project (2001, 2002). 
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Figure 8.  Devolution Initiative Theory of Change 
 
 
Information development and dissemination played a prominent role.  As welfare reform 
and health care decision making devolved to the state and local levels, the belief was 
that policymakers who found themselves faced with decisions about new devolution-
related issues would need and want to better understand the issues in order to make 
good and informed decisions.  Consequently, the Initiative invested substantially in 
research, monitoring, and policy analysis to track what was happening as a result of 
devolution, and to disseminate that information, in diverse and user-friendly formats, in 
states.  Initiative participants developing information were expected to reach a broad 
range of audiences, including policymakers directly, and advocates at the state and local 
levels who would then use that information in their policy advocacy activities.  
 
The Initiative theorized that media advocacy would be another way to get the messages 
and implications coming out of research, monitoring, and policy analysis to this wide 
array of audiences.  All of the Initiative’s participating organizations (national and state) 
conducted media outreach and advocacy for the purpose of getting media coverage and 
visibility for the issues and positions they focused on.  The hope was that this media 
coverage would have two main effects – to increase public awareness and build the 
support necessary to place pressure on policymakers to make good and informed policy 
decisions, and to increase policymaker (state-level specifically because of devolving 
authority) awareness and support directly.  Media advocacy activities most often took the 
form of events (e.g., press conferences or events that attracted media attention) that 
coincided with “policy windows” of influence (Kingdon, 1984), relationship building with 
reporters and editorial boards, and the dissemination of press releases, op-eds, and 
editorials to highlight and reframe issues.  
 
For the Devolution Initiative participants, their concern was not only increasing the 
quantity of coverage and the visibility of their messages in it, but the quality of it as well.  
As such, a considerable amount of front-end effort was spent in understanding how the 
media had been framing welfare reform and health care stories.  They learned that in the 
mid-1990s, as welfare reform began, media coverage historically had tended to place 
responsibility on low-income individuals for their plot in life, and gave those same 
individuals responsibility for pulling themselves out of poverty (Gamson & Lasch, 1983; 
Heintz-Knowles, 1998; Iyengar, 1991; Ryan, 1996).  Initiative participants felt that these 
frames were counterproductive to their messaging, and that the social and institutional 
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reasons for poverty needed to be highlighted more, along with the government’s role in 
helping people to rise out of poverty. 
 
Within the five focus states, other activities complemented and supported information 
development and media advocacy – namely statewide and community-based coalition 
development and policy advocacy.  Coalition activities – such as statewide meetings, 
rallies at the capitol, one-on-one meetings with policymakers, and other activities or 
events – were implemented either to mobilize community awareness and support, or to 
inform policymakers directly.  
 
Focus/Methods 
The Harvard Family Research Project (HFRP) based in Cambridge, Massachusetts 
evaluated the Devolution Initiative.  The evaluation assessed the theory of change 
components that are bolded in Figure 8.   
 
A systematic document review assessed information development.  Four years of 
participant documents and materials were collected and analyzed to track indicators 
about their content, format, and target audiences.   
 
Dissemination, media advocacy, and coalition development and policy advocacy 
activities were tracked using multiple methods that included a combination of regular key 
informant interviews and questionnaires, site visits, participant observation, and media 
tracking (see below).  For media advocacy activities, the document review described 
above and other qualitative assessment determined the types of messages that Initiative 
participants disseminated. 
 
The evaluation used a method labeled media tracking to examine media coverage.  This 
process began with the identification of news sources related to the media advocacy 
work of Initiative participants.  Because Initiative participants conducted media outreach 
at both the national and state levels, the 29 electronic and print sources chosen included 
five newspapers,32 and four broadcast services,33 with a national reach; the two 
newspapers with the largest circulation in each of the five focus states; and ten ethnic 
media sources with either a national circulation or readership in one of the five states 
(Initiative media advocacy included targeted outreach to the ethnic media). 
 
Using carefully-selected search terms and criteria, evaluators searched for welfare 
reform and health-care-related articles using electronic news searching services (e.g., 
Lexis-Nexis), or by reading non-electronically-available newspapers in their entirety.  
Once the population of welfare reform and health care-related articles was identified, a 
quarterly sample was selected analysis.  A total of 2,391 articles – 552 on welfare 
reform, and 1,839 on health care – were selected.  Content analysis followed a 
structured coding protocol, and assessed six main aspects of the coverage: 1) amount of 
overall coverage, 2) issues covered, 3) frames used in coverage, 3) messages 
conveyed, 4) mention of groups affected by devolution, and 5) sources used to inform 
coverage.   
 
The evaluation documented public/community awareness and support at the state level 
by tracking various state and community organizing and mobilization indicators (e.g. 
                                                 
32 USA Today, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post 
33 ABC News, NBC News, CBS News, NPR 
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coalition membership over time, participation levels in policy advocacy) using key 
informant interviews and surveys. 
 
Questionnaires and interviews with state-level policymakers, staffers, and administrators 
responsible for decision making about health care and welfare reform issues assessed 
indicators of policymaker awareness and support. 
 
Policy outcomes and implementation related to the policy focus areas in each state (e.g., 
immigrant access to health care; child health insurance eligibility and enrollment; child 
care access, cost, and quality) were tracked using a tailored policy tracking system in 
each state, which relied on regular searching of a set of legislative, media, and policy 
alert electronic sources.  Regular interviews with Initiative participants verified this 
information.   
 
Design/Analysis 
The evaluation design followed a “theory of change” approach.  This approach requires 
the articulation of the theory of change at the beginning of the Initiative, which then 
serves as a guide for the Initiative’s ongoing strategic development and management.  
Evaluators then seek evidence that the components of the theory are in place and that 
the theorized links between the activities and their intended outcomes exist (Connell, 
Kubisch, Schorr, & Weiss, 1995).   
 
The Devolution Initiative evaluation did not attempt to determine whether the 
components of the theory of change were causally linked in the five focus states.  
Rather, the focus was on the independent assessment of each component, using 
multiple methods where possible, followed by a longitudinal case study approach in each 
of the five states that examined qualitatively and sequentially the relationships between 
the components. 
 
The primary question was – Can a plausible and defensible case be made that the 
theory of change worked as anticipated and that Devolution Initiative investments had 
their intended effects?  For example, for media advocacy, the evaluation combined the 
stand-alone quantitative analysis of the media coverage, with a qualitative assessment 
of whether that coverage matched the intent of the messages Initiative participants were 
sending through their media advocacy activities. 
 
Key Findings 
About information development and dissemination: 
- Over 1,200 documents resulted from Initiative investments in research, 
monitoring, and policy analysis.  Information was targeted to an appropriately 
diverse range of audiences and was user-friendly in format. 
 
About media advocacy and coalition development and policy advocacy activities: 
- The Initiative supported nine statewide coalitions in the five states with 
memberships that grew collectively to over 800 individuals and organizations.  All 
coalitions increased their membership under the DI and implemented media 
advocacy and policy informing activities. 
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About media coverage:   
- Amount:  While articles about health care coverage outnumbered articles about 
welfare reform by more than three to one, coverage overall in terms of quantity 
was limited for both issues. 
- Framing:  There was more evidence of the social responsibility frame in media 
coverage of both health care and welfare reform than the individual responsibility 
frame – a finding that resonated with Initiative participants’ intents. 
- Sources:  Researchers, policy experts, and advocates – the types of 
organizations supported under the Devolution Initiative – were among the top five 
sources cited in both health care and welfare reform articles.  Private 
corporations and federal policymakers were top sources in health care.  Public 
administrators and policymakers were most often cited in welfare reform articles.  
While Initiative participants worked to change this, the voices of those affected by 
devolution were rarely featured or used as sources. 
 
About public/community awareness and support: 
- Each coalition’s membership grew and diversified under the Initiative, with a 
focus on adding nontraditional partners and underrepresented groups.   
- The Initiative mobilized and nurtured a large number of new advocates (though 
few new leaders emerged).  These new voices were mobilized to inform local, 
state, and federal policy through mechanisms such as testimony at legislative 
hearings, one-on-one meetings with policymakers, and participation in policy 
advisory groups.   
 
About policymaker awareness and support: 
- State policymakers reported using Initiative participants and information as 
sources to inform their policy decisions, though the findings about this 
component in the theory of change were somewhat inconclusive due to 
measurement issues and challenges. 
 
About state-level policy outcomes and implementation: 
- A plausible case existed that the theory of change worked as intended in the five 
states and that state-level advocates and coalitions informed 22 state-level policy 
issues in 1999-2000 and 47 issues in 2000-2001. 
- Intended policy outcomes, including results in which advocates successfully “held 
the line” (e.g. avoided cuts to funding or eligibility), were achieved for 17 of the 22 
issues grantees informed in 1999-2000 and 32 of 47 issues in 2000-2001.   
 
Evaluation Lessons 
This evaluation was both time- and resource-intensive, covering six years and requiring 
a large evaluation investment.  In essence, the evaluation used multiple methods to 
assess each component in the theory of change, and then assessed qualitatively 
whether a plausible case could be made that those components were linked as 
expected. 
 
Theory of change evaluation has value for policy change campaigns.  The theory of 
change approach to evaluation, which was used with the Devolution Initiative, is growing 
in popularity among evaluations of complex social initiatives that emerge and change 
over time and try to effect change on multiple levels.  It is a response to traditional 
evaluation approaches that cannot adequately deal with this type of complexity and lack 
of control over the intervention.  Since most policy change campaigns share this type of 
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complexity, this approach could have much value in this field.  While this case s tudy 
featured a large-scale evaluation, it is possible to adapt and implement this approach on 
a smaller scale.  In addition, while this evaluation attempted to provide a plausible case, 
and not a conclusive one, about relationships between the theory of change 
components, it is possible to incorporate methodological elements into this design, such 
as comparison groups or inclusion of counterfactuals, that can strengthen confidence in 
interpretations about effects and causation (e.g., Weitzman, Silver, & Dillman, 2002). 
 
There is value in looking at multiple factors in the analysis of media coverage.  Drawing 
from the experience of others who have raised the importance of including media frames 
and other variables about media content in research related media advocacy (e.g., 
Bales, 2002; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), this evaluation attempted to include an 
assessment of frames, issues covered, messages, and article sources in its analysis of 
welfare reform and health care media coverage.  There were challenges to this 
approach, including that it can be extremely resource-intensive, difficult to identify the 
right set of codes and ensure inter-coder reliability when coding is subjective.  In 
addition, while there was considerable formative value in this approach for Initiative 
participants, questions exist about whether the strength and length of the intervention 
was strong enough to produce desired changes, particularly regarding framing.  Many of 
these issues will require more attention in future evaluations of media advocacy, but the 
fact remains that when it comes to media advocacy, which tries to affect both quantity 
and quality of media coverage, the further search for efficient ways of incorporating 
quality into evaluation efforts is needed. 
 
Campaign information needs and stage of development should factor into evaluation 
design.  It is important to note here that the Devolution Initiative evaluation focused 
heavily on learning and continuous feedback to inform the Initiative as it developed.  This 
fact influenced greatly how the evaluation was designed.  For example, it was a widely 
accepted premise in the theory of change that media advocacy was an important part of 
trying to achieve policy change.  Therefore questions about causal effects were 
somewhat less important than understanding how the media was covering the issues 
Initiative participants were working on, and then feeding that information about needs 
and opportunities back into the Initiative.  This required the analysis of coverage content 
described above.  Because this in turn required considerable resources to achieve, the 
tradeoff was between focusing resources on the systematic analysis of media coverage 
and feeding back information regularly, and developing an evaluation design that would 
assess causal effects but might not return results until the end of the initiative.  The 
evaluators chose the former.       
 
 
Harvard Family Research Project 36 
V. CROSS-CASE STUDY LESSONS 
 
Much has been said already about the fact that the field of communications evaluation 
has a long way to go in its development.  There are countless challenges that make 
evaluation difficult and progress incremental.  But the field is at the point where it needs 
to stop using the challenges as excuses, and address more clearly how to tackle those 
challenges.  The examples in this paper were designed to illustrate different responses 
to the “how” question.  Characteristics of the evaluations featured that should be more 
prevalent in this field include: 
 
?  Evaluation based on a sound (and where possible research-based) conceptual 
model of how the campaign will achieve social change (e.g. theory of change) 
?  Front-end research that informs where the campaign and the evaluation should 
focus (too often it is only the former or neither). 
?  Recognition and acceptance that different evaluation needs and capabilities 
require different evaluation designs (and that causation is not always the most 
important question).  But at the same, recognition that leverage to convince 
sponsors to invest in campaigns will be enhanced by causal analysis of 
campaign impacts. 
?  Recognition of the interpretive boundaries associated with specific evaluation 
designs (and then staying within those boundaries). 
?  A focus on evaluation for learning and continuous improvement (often related to 
a collaborative relationship between the evaluation and campaign staff). 
?  A commitment by campaign staff to be resourceful when necessary and find 
ways to track data on their own when possible. 
?  A push for methodological innovation and rigor when possible, and not always 
relying on the same approach (i.e. random sample or repeated sample pre- and 
post-campaign surveys). 
?  A recognition that evaluation can respond to the hard-to-answer questions (e.g. 
whether attention to social context is a necessary ingredient of behavior change, 
or whether media advocacy can contribute to policy change). 
 
Below is a set of overarching case study lessons that expand on these factors, and have 
implications for how future work to build evaluation capacity can proceed.  Lessons are 
arranged in the same organizing categories used in the case studies. 
 
Theories of Change 
 
Sound (and where possible research-based) theories of change help to avoid 
ineffectual evaluation.  As the case studies illustrate, while there are some 
similarities to the way campaigns are designed, each is unique.  Their focus in the 
short- and longer-term depends on many factors, such as how new the issue is, who 
it is targeting, and the type of change being sought.  An alarming number of 
evaluations, however, discount the fact that campaigns are different, and use cookie 
cutter evaluation approaches.  Such generic approaches are not as common in other 
fields.  There could be a number of reasons why it happens in this one, including that 
Harvard Family Research Project 37 
the theory behind how communications efforts achieve their intended change is 
largely unknown to many or has not been thought through, or the fact that the tools 
for facilitating the process of thinking through what campaigns are trying to 
accomplish in the short- and longer-term are not available, or widely used.  This 
paper tried to make some progress on each of these accounts, by using one well-
known evaluation tool – the theory of change.  Future work needs to advance both 
the availability of tools like this for evaluation planning, and the sophistication of our 
collective thinking about how theories of change look (and work) for different types of 
campaigns. 
 
Focus/Methods 
 
Measurement challenges often require innovative methods.  Target audience 
surveys done before and after a campaign will probably always be a standard 
method in this field.  The case studies revealed, however, that other innovative 
methods exist for some challenging evaluation problems.  Approaches like the rolling 
sample surveys used with the Voluntary Ozone Action Program have much more 
potential (and interpretive power) than traditional surveys if the conditions are right.  
The activity and event chronologies in the Community Trials Project, which were 
used to link community organizing and media advocacy to policy change and 
implementation, can be extremely useful for policy change evaluations and do not 
require extensive methodological expertise to create.  Media tracking, as used in the 
Community Trials Project and Devolution Initiative, can easily yield much more 
information than the typical article counts.  And the unique “in-home methodology” 
used in the Safe Gun Storage campaign to assess brand retention and ad recall is 
another example of how methods can be innovative in this context.  More methods 
like these exist and need to be shared; still more are waiting to be developed. 
 
Design/Analysis 
 
Along with purpose, the campaign’s stage of development and information 
needs should factor into evaluation design.  The case studies here represented a 
diverse array of evaluation approaches, including experimental, quasi-experimental, 
and non-experimental.  The intent here was not to say that one approach is better 
than other; it was to say that different questions require different approaches.  The 
Safe Gun Storage Campaign evaluation design - repeated random sample surveys – 
provided the opportunity to judge effects, with some interpretive constraints, but also 
with a reasonable time and resource investment.  In the case of STOP IT NOW! 
VERMONT, the primary need was to test some of the assumptions in the emerging 
theory of change and to collect data that would be useful for learning.  The design 
did not set out to prove if the campaign caused effects observed, but its designers 
were not trying to answer that question.  They wanted to collect useful data that 
would help the campaign to know if they were on track and where to go next.  In the 
case of the Voluntary Ozone Action Program, federal funding was at risk if ground-
level ozone levels were not reduced.  The campaign needed to determine and 
demonstrate if the investments they made worked.  Consequently, a response to that 
question required an experimental design.  With the Community Trials Project, one of 
the main purposes was to find prevention strategies that worked and could be 
replicated, therefore it used a quasi-experimental approach.  The Devolution 
Initiative’s theory of change evaluation was to designed to both fit with an evolving 
and complex policy change initiative and promote learning, therefore it examined 
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intended or theorized results compared to actual results at regular intervals 
throughout the six-year effort. 
 
While the introduction to this paper stated that there is a need for more 
methodological rigor in general in this field, this does not mean that every evaluation 
should use an experimental or quasi-experimental approach.  This often is not even 
feasible since these types of designs typically require much time and money.  Rather 
than promote one design over another, the better solution is to help people make 
appropriate and acceptable choices based on the campaign’s needs and what 
resources are available. 
 
Key Findings 
 
Evidence is growing about the conditions necessary for success.  In addition to 
offering practical information about different ways of approaching evaluation, this set 
of case studies offers some substantive findings of interest that contribute to the 
growth of our knowledge base about what it takes for campaigns to achieve social 
change.  Two of the case studies featured in particular – the Volunteer Ozone Action 
Program and the Community Trials Project – offer some conclusive findings about 
key questions that surface repeatedly in this field.  They serve as guidance, or 
evidence if you will, about the conditions that are essential for effectiveness for 
behavior and policy change.  The Volunteer Ozone Action Program evaluation told 
us that information alone was insufficient to produce behavior change; attention to 
social context was necessary.  While this is not a new supposition, this evaluation 
confirmed it.  The Community Trials Project evaluation showed us that community 
organizing combined with media advocacy can lead to effects on media coverage, 
key leader support, and subsequently policy change.  For policy change campaigns, 
such evidence based on systematic evaluation is rare, and important.  Cumulative 
evidence from these evaluations and others are essential to the continuing 
development of knowledge about how to design and evaluate campaigns that have 
better chances of success.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Project to Build Evaluation Capacity of Nonprofit Communications 
First-Stage Research Projects 
(Coordinated by the Communications Consortium Media Center) 
 
Coffman, J. (2002, April).  Public communication campaign evaluation: An 
environmental scan of challenges, criticisms, practice, and opportunities.   
Cambridge, MA:  Harvard Family Research Project.  Presents what has been 
happening in the field of public communication campaign evaluation in recent years. It 
examines evaluation challenges, criticisms, and practice and includes sections on 
relevant theory, outcomes, and useful methods for designing evaluations. It ends with 
opportunities for the road ahead. 
 
Dorfman, L., Ervice J., Woodruff, K. (2002, November).  Voices for change: A 
taxonomy of public communications campaigns and their evaluation challenges.  
Berkeley, CA:  Berkeley Media Studies Group.  Makes the case that communications 
campaigns cover a broad range of different types and characteristics, and can be 
differentiated along the axes of purpose, scope, and maturity.  Examines what 
communications campaigns that fall on different areas of these three axes look like, and 
how where they fall may affect the evaluation approach used and lead to distinct 
evaluation challenges and needs.  
 
Salmon, C.T, Post, L.A., & Christensen, R.E. (2003, June).  Mobilizing public will 
for social change.  Lansing, MI: Michigan State University.  Examines the theory and 
strategies of “public will” campaigns and offers tangible criteria for their evaluation.  It 
provides a rich inventory of strategies for use in mobilizing the public will through an 
integration of models of agenda building, social problem construction, issues 
management, social movements, media advocacy, and social capital.  In addition, the 
paper provides cases and examples of public will campaigns directed at various social 
problems, along with criteria for evaluating these campaigns at various stages of a social 
problem’s life cycle. 
 
Coffman, J. (2003, June).  Lessons in evaluating communications campaigns:  
Five case studies.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard Family Research Project.  Builds on 
the findings of the first and second papers.  It examines specifically how campaigns with 
different purposes (individual behavior change and policy change) have been evaluated, 
and how evaluators have tackled some of the associated evaluation challenges that the 
first three papers raised as important to address.  It features five brief case studies in 
which the main unit of analysis is not the campaign, but the campaign’s evaluation.  The 
case studies provide a brief snapshot of the real experiences of campaign evaluations.  
The paper also features cross-case lessons that highlight important findings and themes. 
 
 
 
